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Abstract: 
The establishment of the EU banking union reveals two major shortcomings of liberal 
intergovernmentalism. First, it fails to explain the preference formation of the most important 
actor – the German government. The banking sector was divided between public and private 
banks, and there is no clear-cut pattern about whose interests the German government 
promoted. Second, material bargaining power cannot account for German concessions despite 
favourable power asymmetries. This article seeks to demonstrate how an ideational frame can 
convincingly fill these gaps. Ordoliberal ideas were constitutive for German preferences. The 
manipulative use of ideas as strategic resources by the German government’s opponents explains 
why it made significant concessions. Germany’s government publicly acknowledged that breaking 
the ‘vicious circle’ between banks and sovereigns was the main objective of the banking union. 
This became a rhetorical trap used by a coalition of Southern European member states to force 
the German government to make concessions.  
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Introduction 
The EU banking union is the most recent grand bargain of European integration. It constitutes 
the most significant EU agreement since the Maastricht Treaty with a remarkable transfer of 
sovereignty to the European level, consisting of four major elements: A common rulebook as a 
means to harmonise regulatory standards in the financial sector; the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), which establishes a joint banking supervision for the eurozone and potentially 
other EU member states willing to join; the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), to restructure 
or resolve failing banks; and a joint deposit guarantee scheme. With regard to the latter, however, 
member states only opted for a harmonisation of national schemes with more far-reaching 
options being considered at the time of writing. 
How do we explain the outcome of the banking union negotiations? Comparative political 
economists would explain the preferences of member states and the creation of the banking 
union with the economic structure of the member states. However, key member states rejected a 
banking union still in 2011 and the structure of their domestic industries cannot explain why they 
ended up changing their mind (De Rynck, 2016, p. 120). Epstein argues that the 
internationalization of transnational banks has contributed to centralization, but banking has 
retrenched to national markets since 2008 (Epstein, 2014). Other scholars explain the creation of 
the banking union with the eurozone being at the verge of failing, and member states therefore 
agreeing to it in order to prevent the break-up of the currency area (see e.g. Schimmelfennig, 
2015). However, crisis pressures may explain why governments take action, but it does not explain 
what action they take. Neo-functionalists are more specific and predict a fully-fledged banking 
union as part of a genuine EMU (see Niemann and Ioannou, 2015, p. 213), but in the absence of 
a deposit scheme and a fiscal backstop this kind of banking union clearly did not come about.  
The ‘baseline theory’ (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 67) of European integration with 
a particular strength in explaining EU grand bargains is liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 
1999). Yet, applying it to the banking union negotiations leaves us with two major unresolved 
puzzles for liberal intergovernmentalism. First, liberal intergovernmentalism explains the 
preferences of the member states by resorting to domestic interest groups. However, the 
preferences of the German government appear to match neither the interests of the domestic 
banking sector nor those of producer groups.  
Second, liberal intergovernmentalism relies on an intergovernmental bargaining theory to explain 
interstate negotiations. It suggests that the outcome of the banking union negotiations is likely to 
reflect the German government’s preferences because of its superior bargaining power based on 
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its vast financial resources. Nonetheless, the German government made significant concessions 
on all four contentious issues of the negotiations. Liberal intergovernmentalism cannot account 
for these concessions. 
This article invokes an ideational frame to solve the two puzzles that the banking union 
negotiations pose for liberal intergovernmentalism. It understands ideas1 as being constitutive for 
preferences, as suggested in the works by Hall (1993) and McNamara (1998), as well as serving 
the purpose of manipulative strategic resources in negotiations, hereby following Schimmelfennig 
(2001) and Jabko (2006). First, against the background of a strong division of the banking sector 
in Germany, not material interests but ordoliberal ideas were the primary source of the 
government’s preferences. This paper argues that there is strong evidence to support German 
finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s assertion that the German government ‘followed 
ordoliberal principles for the creation of the banking union’ (Schäuble, 2014a). Second, the 
German government conceded because it was rhetorically entrapped. The most important idea 
was the ‘vicious circle’, which identifies the cause for the eurozone’s problems in the ‘deadly 
embrace’ (De Grauwe, 2013a, p. 3) between banks and sovereigns: Contagion is seen to spread 
from one to the other and thereby impedes a return to growth. This idea gained prominence by 
the end of 2011 (Véron, 2011, pp. 9–10) and finally became the predominant idea to make sense 
of the crisis. The Euro Summit in June 2012 finally recognised its importance by concluding that 
it was ‘imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns’ (Euro Summit, 2012, 
p. 1) and in order to do so settled on the creation of the banking union. A coalition of Southern 
European member states linked the goal of breaking the vicious circle with a specific institutional 
design of the banking union including at least some mutualisation, which ran counter to German 
preferences. Since the causal claims of the vicious circle were acknowledged by the German 
government (Merkel, 2012), the need for argumentative consistency made it vulnerable to 
demands for further mutualisation. It was thus ultimately forced to make concessions despite 
commanding superior material bargaining power.  
The most insightful contemporary accounts of the banking union negotiations by Howarth and 
Quaglia (2013; 2014) implicitly share many liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions and logics by 
emphasising the importance of material interests and bargaining power. Their highly valuable 
contribution clarifies the most relevant material interests and the preference configuration in the 
negotiations. Nonetheless, their work critically underestimates the impact of ideas on both the 
domestic preference formation and the intergovernmental negotiations, which is otherwise widely 
                                                 
1 Ideas are defined as cognitive or normative beliefs (Schmidt, 2008, pp. 306–307). 
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acknowledged in the literature (McNamara, 1998; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999; Jabko, 2006; 
Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013).  
 
This article directs our attention to the distinction between two notable coalitions among the 
actors involved in the negotiations: a Germanic coalition including Germany, Finland, the 
Netherlands and some other mostly Northern European eurozone member states, and a 
Southern coalition composed of France, Spain, Italy, and other economically weaker eurozone 
member states. The latter were repeatedly supported by the Commission, the European 
Parliament and occasionally the European Central Bank. The analysis is confined to the most 
contentious issues of the negotiations, namely: (a) the scope of application of banking union, (b) 
the ‘bail-in’ provisions, (c) the establishment of the Single Resolution Fund, and (d) the decision-
making procedure in the SRM.  
 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism: economic interests and material bargaining 
power 
Applying liberal intergovernmentalist insights to the banking union negotiations, we can derive 
two main hypotheses, relating to its two core components: preference formation and interstate 
bargaining. Firstly, with regard to the former, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that a state’s 
‘[p]references reflect the objectives of those domestic groups which influence the state apparatus’ 
in a specific issue-area (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 24), hence in this case banking associations.  
Germany’s three pillar banking system is composed of eight Landesbanken (regional banks), more 
than 400 Sparkassen (savings banks), around 1,200 cooperative banks, and 200 private banks. 
When counting the many small Sparkassen as one entity they constitute a powerful financial group 
with a market share of the German banking business of around 30% and more assets than 
Deutsche Bank (Howarth and Quaglia, 2014, pp. 130–131; Hardie and Howarth, 2013, p. 108; 
Seikel, 2014, p. 176). They engage in ‘patient lending’ to SMEs and have strong ties to politics. 
Both Landesbanken and Sparkassen benefitted massively from state guarantees for a long time. 
Strong networks across all political parties shielded the public banks against attempts to liberalise 
the German market. The Sparkassen remain of high significance to German politicians due to 
selective benefits for politicians such as board seats and governance financing. By contrast, the 
Landesbanken have lost ground in their battle to defend their privileges such as state guarantees 
due to pressure from the European Commission since the late 1990s (Seikel, 2014). Moreover, 
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the Sparkassen have their own resolution system which increases their importance to German 
politicians. The private banks include Deutsche Bank with a worldwide presence and 
Commerzbank with a notable European presence. The largest five banks account for 22% of the 
assets of all financial institutions (Hardie and Howarth, 2013, pp. 107–108). While the 
importance of the savings banks is based on their patient lending to SMEs, the large private 
banks and especially Deutsche Bank have a vital function in Germany’s banking sector by 
providing funding for large scale projects whose volumes exceed the capacity of the savings 
banks and Landesbanken. While the public banks and especially the Sparkassen sought to defend 
their privileged position in the German market, the private banks perceived the banking union as 
an opportunity to create a level playing field. As it is reasonable to assume that the lobbying 
power of public and private banks is by and large equally strong, we also hypothesise that the 
government followed a compromise between both banking groups.  
H1a: The preferences of the German government follow the interests of German Sparkassen. 
H1b: The preferences of the German government follow the interests of German private banks. 
H1c: The preferences of the German government follow a compromise between German Sparkassen 
and private banks. 
If the government’s preferences were in line with those of the public banks, we would, according 
to the banks’ stated preferences, expect the government to advocate a limited scope excluding 
particularly the Sparkassen, and to promote weak and non-automatic bail-in provisions, a mere 
harmonisation of national funds and an effective SRM decision-making procedure. If the 
government followed the private banks, we would expect it to favour a broad scope, strong and 
automatic bail-in rules applying to all banks, a joint fund with contributions from all banks, and 
an effective SRM decision-making procedure. In regard to hypothesis 1c, it should be noted that 
not any possible preference in-between the two banking associations’ ideal-points can count as 
compromise. Due to the division between private and public banks, their interests are located at 
the opposite extreme ends of possible ideal-points. Problematically, if anything in-between these 
opposite extreme ends counts as compromise, this would make it impossible to falsify the stated 
hypothesis. Thus to be more precise, the observable outcome has to be roughly in the middle 
between the two equally powerful banking associations’ interests, so as to keep this hypothesis 
falsifiable. In other words, if on a scale from 0 to 1 the public banks are located at 0 and the 
private banks at 1, we would expect the government to be at 0.5. It would then advocate a 
moderate scope including Landesbanken, moderate bail-in provisions, some joint liabilities 
regarding the funds needed (e.g. credit lines between national funds), and, since in this last issue 
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there was no disagreement between both banking associations, a streamlined decision-making 
procedure without national vetoes.  
 
Secondly, with regard to the second core component of liberal intergovernmentalism, the 
outcome of intergovernmental negotiations ‘reflect[s] the relative power of states – more 
precisely, patterns of asymmetrical interdependence’ (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 3). The German 
government possessed by far the highest bargaining power due to its vast financial resources and 
the size of its banking sector. In contrast to the Southern coalition, its preference intensity was 
low because of its ability to bail-out or resolve its banks autonomously, which effectively 
rendered no-agreement a feasible alternative (Howarth and Quaglia, 2014, pp. 130–131). 
 
H2: The outcome of the banking union negotiations reflects the preferences of the German 
government. 
Evidence for the importance of Germany’s material bargaining power in the banking union 
agreement would be a high similarity between German government’s preferences and the 
outcome of the negotiations. Hence, the Sparkassen would be excluded from the scope, there 
would be strong and automatic bail-in rules, only a harmonisation of national resolution funds, 
and member states could veto bank resolutions.  
 
Domestic preference formation: Explaining preferences with the interests of the 
German banking sector 
After having established the liberal intergovernmentalist hypotheses in the last section, they will 
now be tested empirically. We start with the first step in liberal intergovernmentalism, i.e. the 
domestic preference formation, and turn to the interstate bargaining in the next section. The first 
of the four main contentious issues was the question of which banks the rules of the banking 
union should apply to. The German banking sector was divided on this question (Financial 
Times, 2012a). Both Landesbanken and Sparkassen lobbied to be excluded (BVR/VÖB/DSGV, 
2012, p. 1; BVR/VÖB/DSGV, 2013, p. 5), while the private banks wanted to have them 
included as a means to put an end to more favourable conditions for public banks on the 
German market (BDB, 2013a, pp. 3–4). The association of major industrial producers, for its 
part, was concerned about the banks’ lending capacity, which points to a preference for the 
exclusion of the Sparkassen (BDI, 2014). The German government advocated a very limited scope 
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even excluding the Landesbanken from the SSM (Financial Times, 2012a). Its preferences appear 
to match the interests of Sparkassen and Landesbanken in this case, which is evidence for the 
hypothesis 1a. Yet, if the public banks were indeed much more powerful, we would expect the 
government to consistently represent their preferences across all four issues. We will see below if 
that was the case.  
The bail-in rules were the second contentious issue of the banking union negotiations. They 
apply to all EU member states. A ‘bail-in’ refers to the obligation of investors to bear part of the 
costs of a bank resolution or restructuring. The German banking sector was again divided. 
Sparkassen and Landesbanken were opposed to strong and automatic bail-in rules 
(BVR/VÖB/DSGV, 2013, p. 6) and received lukewarm support from the industrial lobby which 
was concerned about a lower lending capacity (BDI, 2014, p. 1). The private banks were more 
favourably inclined, provided the bail-in would apply to all banks in order to create a level playing 
field (BDB, 2013b). In contrast to the scope, we see that on this issue the government’s 
preference overtly matches that of the private banks because it advocated strong bail-in rules with 
a high degree of automaticity (Agence Europe, 2014a; Agence Europe, 2013a; Financial Times, 
2013a). With one match for each of the banking associations, we can conclude that so far it 
seems the government did not follow any of the two groups consistently. We do not have strong 
evidence for the compromise hypothesis either as in none of the two contentious issues the 
government’s preference matched that of a compromise between both associations. 
The third contentious issue was the question whether there should be a joint bank resolution 
fund or a mere harmonisation of national funds. The German government was faced with 
considerable pressure from the public banks to reject a joint resolution fund. They considered 
their own institutionalised security system sufficiently resilient (BVR/VÖB/DSGV, 2013, p. 12). 
Provided that all banks would have to contribute, the private banks welcomed the idea of a joint 
fund (BDB, 2014; BDB, 2013a, pp. 2–4), as did the producers (BDI, 2014, p. 3). The German 
government advocated a network of harmonised national funds to ensure control over the 
resources (Agence Europe, 2013a; Howarth and Quaglia, 2014, p. 129; Schäuble, 2013). This 
clearly matches the public banks’ preference again.  
Fourthly, the governments negotiated who should have the decision-making power on bank 
resolutions. Both the German private and public banks (BDB, 2013a, p. 4; BVR/VÖB/DSGV, 
2013, p. 10) and the producers (BDI, 2013, pp. 6–7) insisted on decision-making effectiveness 
and preferred an impartial committee over an involvement by the Council or Commission. A 
Council involvement would have made decision-making very complex. However, the German 
government strongly objected to allocating the final decision-making power about bank 
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resolutions to the European Commission. It was concerned about a conflict of interests between 
the Commission’s role as state-aid watchdog and bank resolution authority. The German 
government preferred the Council to decide about bank resolutions (Agence Europe, 2013a; 
Agence Europe, 2013b; Financial Times, 2013b). This case is particularly puzzling for interest-
based accounts because the diverse interest groups were united in their opposition to the 
government’s preference. None of the material interest hypotheses explains the government’s 
preference on this issue.  
In sum, there is weak evidence that the material interest hypotheses explain German preferences. 
As the government’s preferences match the interests of the Landesbanken and Sparkassen in only 
two of the four cases, it did not consistently follow them (hypothesis 1a). Also there is only one 
match between the government and the interests of the private banks, which means that the 
government did not follow the private banks either (hypothesis 1b). The compromise hypothesis 
is disconfirmed in all four cases because in no case the government’s preferences correspond to a 
compromise between both associations (hypothesis 1c). There are random matches, but no clear 
pattern emerges. We can conclude that a liberal intergovernmentalist account produces 
unsatisfactory results in explaining German preferences.  
 
Interstate negotiations: Explaining banking union with material bargaining power 
After having attempted to explain German preferences in the last section, we now test if liberal 
intergovernmentalism is more successful in explaining the outcome of the interstate negotiations 
on the four contentious issues. 
The German government’s preference for a very limited scope of the banking union was 
contested by a broad counter-coalition of member state governments. While several of them 
acknowledged that the ECB could not oversee all banks directly, the German government was 
isolated in its attempt to establish a two-tier system. The counter-coalition led by France, the 
European Parliament, the Commission and the ECB advocated that the SSM should have final 
responsibility for all banks in (at least) the eurozone through direct or indirect supervision 
(Agence Europe, 2013b; Agence Europe, 2013a; Howarth and Quaglia, 2013, pp. 112–113).  
 
Table 1: Negotiations on the scope of the banking union 
Germany’s 
position 
Parties 
aligning to 
Germany 
Position of the 
counter-
coalition 
Parties forming the 
counter-coalition 
Outcome of the negotiations 
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Restrict scope 
to large banks 
Slovakia All banks 
covered by SSM 
All member states except 
Germany+Slovakia; 
Commission, ECB 
Scope limited to ‘significant’ 
banks, emergency clause for 
ECB 
 
The outcome of the negotiations is a restriction of the scope of the SSM and SRM to 
‘significant’2 banks, i.e. most importantly those with assets exceeding 30 billion euro or 20% of 
the host member states’ GDP. 120 banks holding 85% of bank assets in the eurozone are 
covered by the SSM and SRM. This excludes the savings banks except for one institute, but 
includes all German Landesbanken with one exception (Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014, pp. 2–3; 
European Central Bank, 2014; Howarth and Quaglia, 2014, p. 131). The ECB may at any time 
assume supervision powers for non-significant banks as well in order to ensure the consistent 
application of supervisory standards. National supervisors still maintain considerable leverage, 
but following a key demand from France and the Southern coalition, the final responsibility is 
with the ECB (Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014, p. 3). Furthermore, contrary to the government’s 
stated preference all Landesbanken except one are subject to direct ECB supervision (Howarth and 
Quaglia, 2013, p. 112). While one could argue that including the Landesbanken was a strategic 
concession, this argument is not convincing in regard to the role of the ECB as ‘indirect 
supervisor’ (Gros, 2014, p. 2) of the Sparkassen which ‘departed significantly from Germany’s 
original position’ (Epstein and Rhodes, 2014, p. 18). Against the background of Germany’s 
powerful negotiation position, intergovernmental bargaining theory cannot account for these 
concessions.  
Secondly, the German government was the main advocate of strong and automatic bail-in rules. 
It was supported by Finland and the Netherlands (Finance Ministries, 2012), some other member 
states, the European Parliament and the ECB. They called for an application of bail-in rules 
already in 2015 and very limited discretion regarding the application of the rules (Agence Europe, 
2014a; Agence Europe, 2013a; European Central Bank, 2013a; Financial Times, 2013a). The 
member states of the counter-coalition shared the goal of shifting costs from taxpayers to banks. 
They were, however, reluctant to increase the burden on banks as this was expected to delay the 
economic recovery. They sought an entry into force in 2018 only and more discretionary powers 
(Agence Europe, 2014a; Financial Times, 2013a; Howarth and Quaglia, 2014, p. 134).  
 
Table 2: Negotiations on bail-in rules 
                                                 
2 More precisely, a bank is ‘significant’ if at least one of the following criteria is met: (1) the bank assets exceed 30 
billion euro, (2) they exceed 5 billion euro and simultaneously 20% of the host member state’s GDP, (3) the bank is 
among the three ‘most significant’ banks in the country, (4) it has ‘large’ cross-border activities or (5) receives direct 
financial assistance from the ESM or EFSF (Art. 6 (4), Regulation 2013/1024/EU).  
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German 
position 
Parties aligning to 
Germany 
Position of the 
counter-coalition  
Parties forming the 
counter-coalition 
Outcome of the 
negotiations 
Early bail-
in (2015 or 
2016) 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Latvia, Netherlands, UK; 
ECB, EP  
Bail-in not before 
2018; 
Bulgaria, France, 
Luxembourg, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain 
Bail-in rules apply as 
of 2016 
Strict 
application 
of bail-in 
Belgium; Denmark, 
Finland, Netherlands; 
Commission 
More discretion and 
exemptions to bail-
ins 
France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, UK 
Significant discretion 
and several 
exemptions 
 
 
According to the negotiation outcome the bail-in rules enter into force in 2016. After 8% of a 
bank’s total assets have been bailed-in, public authorities still have some flexibility to decide upon 
mobilising further funds from their own national budget3. The application of bail-in rules is 
subject to a ‘wide array of discretion’ (Buch et al., 2013, p. 24). Once again, this outcome runs 
counter to German preferences. 
Thirdly, the German government was isolated in its rejection of a joint fund. By contrast, the vast 
majority of eurozone member states and the European Parliament supported the Commission’s 
proposal to create a joint resolution fund (Agence Europe, 2013a; Agence Europe, 2013c; 
Bloomberg, 2014).  
 
Table 3: Negotiations on the Single Resolution Fund 
German position Parties aligning 
to Germany 
Position of the 
counter-coalition 
Parties forming the 
counter-coalition 
Outcome of the 
negotiations 
Network of national 
funds 
- 
(Austria) 
Joint fund fully 
mutualised after 5 
years 
All MS except Germany, 
most visible: France, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain; 
Commission, ECB, EP 
Joint fund (SRF), 
8-year 
mutualisation 
period 
 
The negotiations finally settled on a joint fund of 55 billion euros, which is seen as one of the 
German government’s biggest concessions during the negotiations (Gros, 2013, p. 2). The banks 
of each member state pay into national compartments that will be mutualised over an eight-years-
period. Mutualisation starts with 40% in the first year, increases to 60% in the second year and 
the remaining 40% will progressively be mutualised in the remaining six years4. Power-based 
accounts would not expect a concession on this issue: as the contributions from the German 
financial sector are indispensable for the creation of a joint fund, the government’s bargaining 
power is particularly high.  
                                                 
3 See Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), 2014/59/EU, Art. 44.  
4 Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund, 8457/14, 14 May 
2014. 
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Fourthly, the objection of the German government and some mostly Northern European 
member states to allocating decision-making power at the European Commission was challenged 
by the majority of member states. The Commission secured a certain support in the Southern 
coalition by presenting itself as guarantor of an effective decision-making procedure (Agence 
Europe, 2013d; Financial Times, 2013b) and such effectiveness was indeed a top priority for a 
large majority of member states, the ECB, and the European Parliament (Agence Europe, 2014b; 
Howarth and Quaglia, 2014, pp. 134–137).  
 
Table 4: Negotiations on SRM decision-making 
German 
Position 
Parties aligning 
to Germany 
Position of the 
counter-coalition 
Parties forming the 
counter-coalition 
Outcome of the negotiations 
Council 
decides 
about bank 
resolution 
Finland, 
Romania; later 
Germany 
isolated 
Commission or 
Resolution Board 
decides about 
bank resolution 
Large majority of 
member states, later 
all except Germany; 
Commission, ECB, 
EP, Lithuanian 
Council Presidency 
Resolution Board decides on 
resolution scheme; Commission 
assesses discretionary aspects of 
Board decision and Council may 
only object to Commission’s 
decision for specific reasons 
 
The negotiation parties finally agreed that resolution decisions are made by the Resolution Board 
in its executive session composed of the chair, the vice chair, four independent experts, and 
representatives of the relevant national authorities. The ECB and the Commission are observers. 
The Council’s veto powers are restricted to specific reasons and subject to approval by the 
Commission, which is again distant to the German ideal-point (Gros, 2013, p. 2). 
To conclude, the German government made significant concessions on all four contentious 
issues. They are critical and exceed what one could consider merely strategic concessions. We can 
therefore conclude that liberal intergovernmentalism neither explains German preferences nor 
the outcome of the interstate negotiations successfully. There is weak evidence for the hypothesis 
1a, b and c as well as for hypothesis 2.  
The Impact of Ideas on the Banking Union: ordoliberalism and the vicious 
circle between banks and sovereigns 
This section explores if the ideational frame is more successful in explaining both German 
preferences and the outcome of the interstate negotiations. The literature allows us to distinguish 
two major causal mechanisms for the impact of ideas: ideas as source of preferences and ideas as 
strategic resource in negotiations. Starting with the former, Hall argues that policy-makers semi-
automatically follow ideas for understanding problems and finding solutions to address them 
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(Hall, 1993, p. 279). Ideas constitute actors’ preferences and their underlying interests. Actors 
may even internalise ideas, i.e. take their claims as granted and adjust policy accordingly (Checkel, 
2005, pp. 812–813).  
The most relevant set of ideas for the German government’s preferences in EMU negotiations 
are ordoliberal ideas. Their core concern is to align responsibility and liability. Joint liability 
without joint responsibility is believed to cause moral hazard. Hence, a mutualisation of funds 
must go along with a transfer of sovereignty from national governments to the EU level. A stable 
currency ‘begins at home’ (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, p. 275) with sustainable economic and 
fiscal policies at the national level. Rules and market pressure preventing moral hazard are 
‘sacrosanct’ (Nedergaard and Snaith, 2015, p. 1101). Ordoliberals emphasise the need for a 
‘strong state’ that creates and maintains markets by providing the legal and institutional 
framework for efficient markets, but does not assume economic activity itself (Bonatti and 
Fracasso, 2013, pp. 1024–1032; Bulmer, 2014, p. 1246; Siems and Schnyder, 2014, pp. 379–382). 
Especially the German Finance Ministry has a long tradition of ordoliberal ideas which have 
acquired the status of internalised beliefs (Nedergaard and Snaith, 2015; Bulmer, 2014, p. 1257; 
Kaltenthaler, 2002, p. 72).  
These considerations allow us to derive the following hypothesis about domestic preference 
formation.  
H3: The preferences of the German government follow ordoliberal ideas. 
If the German government’s preferences follow ordoliberal ideas, we would expect it to prefer 
aligning responsibility and liability on the national level. In principle, responsibility and liability 
can also be aligned on the supranational level. However, this would require that there is no 
possibility of joint funds (joint liability) being used to compensate for national policy failures 
(national responsibility). To make the case for a more supranational banking union from an 
ordoliberal perspective, the pooling of responsibility would have to go far beyond joint 
supervision and require a political union, which continued to be out of sight during the banking 
union negotiations. Therefore, we would expect the government to advocate a strictly limited 
scope, a network of national funds with no or only very limited cross-national liability, and 
national vetoes in the SRM decision-making as safeguard against joint liability. The government 
would also advocate strong and automatic bail-in rules in order to shift resolution costs from 
taxpayers to banks as another measure to align responsibility and liability. An ordoliberal banking 
union would stabilise EMU and put an end to bank bail-outs financed by the taxpayer to an 
extent that would be impossible in a purely national context, all the while keeping national 
governments liable for their banking sector.  
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Another stream in the literature emphasises the strategic use of ideas in negotiations. According 
to the concept of ‘rhetorical action’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001, pp. 62–66), an actor’s goals have to 
meet the standard of legitimacy in a political community. Actors are able to enhance their 
bargaining power by adding (cheap) legitimacy to their position or constrain the negotiation 
position of other actors by defining ‘no go’ areas of illegitimate behaviour (Schimmelfennig, 
2001, p. 63; Jabko, 2006, pp. 5–8).  
An idea which the German government professes to share is that of the vicious circle between 
banks and sovereigns. The concept describes the ‘deadly embrace’ (De Grauwe, 2013a, p. 3) 
between sovereigns and banks. When states provided financial support to banks, they increased 
their own indebtedness. This in turn devalued sovereign bonds mainly held by banks. When 
banks requested another bail-out, they triggered the vicious circle again. ‘If one of the two falls 
off the cliff the other one is pulled down also’ (De Grauwe, 2013a, p. 3). The vicious circle is also 
closely intertwined with an increasing financial fragmentation in the eurozone and resulting 
difficulties for the ECB to transmit its monetary policy. The vicious circle idea suggests (at least 
some) shared liability for bank failures. However, this runs counter to preferences held by the 
German government. It has consistently opposed mutualisation during the eurozone crisis 
(Epstein and Rhodes, 2014, p. 23). Yet, it had previously acknowledged the existence of the 
vicious circle (Merkel, 2012) and therefore could not credibly argue against its solution. The Euro 
Summit in June 2012 explicitly linked the creation of the banking union with the aim to break the 
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns (Euro Summit, 2012). Negotiators of the SSM and 
SRM described the role of these Euro Summit Conclusions in the negotiations as ‘words of God’ 
and ‘bible’5; all negotiators in the Council were bound by the commitment of the heads of state 
or government to break the bank sovereign link. If the vicious circle was used to rhetorically 
entrap the German government, we would expect the banking union negotiations to entail 
significant concessions on behalf of the German side.  
 
Against this background, we hypothesise the outcome of the interstate bargaining as follows: 
H4: German concessions on significant aspects of the banking union exceed the side payments that 
the material bargaining power of the Southern coalition could extract if the latter can justify its 
demands with reference to ideas that the German government professes to share. 
                                                 
5 Two interviews in the Spanish Treasury, 23 September and 15 October 2015. 
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For this hypothesis to be supported, we would expect the outcome of the negotiations to reflect 
concerns about the banking union’s capacity to break the vicious circle as a salient standard of 
legitimacy. The institutional design regarding scope would ensure an effective banking 
supervision with uniform supervision rules. The bail-in provisions would be weaker and provide 
for some discretion in order to reduce the burden on banks that would cause further 
fragmentation of the financial market. There would be a joint fund for bank resolutions and the 
SRM decision-making procedures would allow for a timely decision to be reached over a 
weekend. 
 
Domestic preference formation: the impact of ordoliberal ideas 
Do ordoliberal ideas explain German preferences? Regarding the scope of the banking union, the 
German government’s quid pro quo for a sharing of liabilities was tighter control of national 
banking systems. It was in doubt about the effectiveness of direct ECB supervision for all 6.000 
banks in the eurozone – a doubt which could be dismissed as purely tactical, but which was 
indeed acknowledged by the ECB as well (Financial Times, 2012a; Schäuble, 2012a). It 
considered ECB oversight over banks with systemic importance the most effective policy to 
ensure effective control over critical parts of the banking system. The German Finance Minister 
Schäuble: ‘It is crucial that the new system be truly effective, not just a façade. (…) This also 
means that it should focus its direct oversight on those banks that can pose a systemic risk at a 
European level’ (Schäuble, 2012b). The ordoliberal core claim to ensure responsibility and 
liability resonates with the government’s preference for an effective system prioritising banks 
with systemic importance. There were also more general doubts if ECB supervision is indeed 
desirable for small locally operating banks. The current German banking system with a high 
number of small savings banks ‘is widely seen as having been a key ingredient of the post-war 
German economic success story’ (Hardie and Howarth, 2013, p. 118) and indispensable for 
maintaining Germany’s economic model (Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013, p. 1028; Hardie and 
Howarth, 2013, pp. 103, 108). However, there is not necessarily a clear-cut economic rationale to 
favour public over private banks (IMF, 2013). Hardie and Macartney (2016) further underline 
that while public banks heavily draw on their social utility rhetorically, there is little evidence that 
it is nearly as high as they claim (see also Cassell, 2016; Véron, 2011, pp. 4-5). Yet, the concern 
that the country’s economic structure could be negatively affected by the banking union plans did 
not resonate with internalised beliefs about the utility of the German banking system and also 
influenced the government’s preferences (Schäuble, 2012c; Financial Times, 2012b). 
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Secondly, we observe a match between the German government’s advocacy for strong and 
automatic bail-in rules with the implications of ordoliberal ideas. In contrast to bail-outs, bail-ins 
increase the liability of investors for their investment decisions and reduce moral hazard in the 
financial sector. It also reduces moral hazard on the interstate level: strong and automatically 
applied bail-in rules make it less likely that pooled resources are needed to cover the resolution 
costs of failing banks in other member states (Siems and Schnyder, 2014, pp. 365–368; see also 
European Central Bank, 2013a). It realigns responsibility and liability, which is also reflected in 
the discourse of Finance Minister Schäuble: ‘We now have European-wide bail-in rules and a 
resolution fund financed by banks. Both measures are reasonable from an ordoliberal point of 
view’ (Schäuble, 2014a). Furthermore, ‘[t]he best way to break the link between banks and states 
is to ensure that enrolling taxpayers to rescue banks becomes the exception rather than the rule’ 
(Schäuble, 2013). The ordoliberal preference for realigning responsibility and liability coincides in 
this case also with the taxpayers’ interests to shift resolution costs from the public purse to the 
banking sector.  
The impact of ordoliberal ideas is also evident in the third case, the Single Resolution Fund. The 
German government resisted a joint fund because a fully mutualised SRF would be prone to 
triggering moral hazard. Member states with lenient banking supervision prior to the crisis could 
effectively be rewarded for their policy failures with access to joint funds (Siems and Schnyder, 
2014, p. 385). While a joint fund would create a joint liability for bank failures, member state 
governments would still have significant national responsibility for their banking sectors. 
Schäuble again stressed realigning responsibility and liability: ‘We made sure that we do not set 
the wrong incentives in the creation of the banking union and the bailout funds. We said we have 
to restore the old principle: Who gets the opportunity also has to take the risk (…). This principle 
is also valid for banking regulation. This, ladies and gentlemen, is ordoliberalism’ (Schäuble, 
2014b). However, an outright rejection of the fund became indefensible because of the German 
government’s isolation. Schäuble thus agreed to a joint fund, but ensured a compromise on 
ordoliberal terms: several safeguards, such as the separation into national compartments and the 
eight years mutualisation period, seek to minimise the risk of moral hazard: ‘As a member of the 
German government I can ensure that the German banks contribute to the funds. I cannot be 
held responsible for Danish or Italian banks. (…) Therefore: as long as the contributions are not 
paid in, the liability remains with the member states’ (Schäuble, 2014b). The German 
government’s opposition to a joint fund was motivated by its concerns with moral hazard and, 
more precisely, a mismatch between responsibility and liability, as suggested by ordoliberal ideas.  
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Lastly, ordoliberal ideas account for the government’s reluctance to allocate decision-making 
powers to the European Commission. The government was again concerned with aligning 
responsibility and liability. Even after handing over supervision powers to the European level, the 
health of banks still depends critically on the policies of national governments. Hence, if a 
government wants to prevent the use of joint funds (joint liability) for national policy failures 
(national responsibility) it requires veto rights in the decision-making procedure. This was 
particularly important as some member states sought using the fund for retrospective bank 
recapitalisations (Howarth and Quaglia, 2013, p. 112). Schäuble stated: ‘We do not want Europe 
to decide and member states to pay. Liability and responsibility must be aligned’ (Der Spiegel, 
2013). While joint supervision pools responsibility to a significant extent, it falls short of a full 
sharing of responsibility in a political union; against this background, ordoliberal ideas help 
explain the preference for national veto rights through an involvement of the Council, serving as 
safeguards against a disproportionate sharing of liability. 
We see across all four issues that the German government’s preferences match the observable 
implications of the ideational approach. The ordoliberal core claim to align responsibility and 
liability guides German preferences. Overall, this is strong evidence for hypothesis 3.  
 
Interstate negotiations: breaking the vicious circle as standard of legitimacy 
This sections tests if ideas can solve the puzzle for power-based approaches of German 
concessions in the interstate negotiations on banking union. As we will see, drawing on the joint 
objective of breaking the vicious circle was a powerful tool to extract concessions from the 
German negotiators. The government had previously committed to this joint objective and this 
became a rhetorical trap; the need for argumentative consistency made the government 
vulnerable towards demands for an institutional design of the banking union which ensures its 
capacity to effectively break the vicious circle. Regarding negotiations on the scope of the 
banking union, a division in the German government facilitated creating a rhetorical trap. 
Whereas Finance Minister Schäuble had already rejected subordinating all banks to a joint 
supervisory scheme in the ECOFIN meeting prior to the Euro Summit in June 2012, Chancellor 
Merkel agreed – albeit reluctantly – to a ‘single’ supervisory system (Euro Summit, 2012, p. 1). 
This summit statement was commonly interpreted as implying that no banks could be effectively 
excluded. Schäuble openly questioned this commitment and pushed back on this issue in the 
negotiations (Schäuble, 2012a; see also Epstein and Rhodes, 2014, p. 17). The Southern coalition 
reminded Schäuble of Merkel’s commitment in the Euro Summit Conclusions: ‘We have no 
mandate for a dual system of supervision, which would call into question the existence of a single 
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system for some banks’ (Moscovici, cit. in Reuters, 2012). The Irish finance minister Noonan 
recalled that ‘[t]he single supervisor is the core element of banking union and a vital step in 
breaking the vicious link between the banks and the sovereigns’ (Financial Times, 2013c). 
Moscovici emphasised the fundamental importance of having some kind of centralised 
supervision for all banks: ‘In the end it must be the ECB that has the responsibility on the whole. 
Otherwise, there is no real system of banking supervision.’ (EU Observer, 2012). The ECB also 
framed a scope encompassing all banks as constituting a pre-condition for an effective banking 
union (European Central Bank, 2013b). Reminding the German government that it 
acknowledged the goal to break the vicious circle made use of a rhetorical trap and pressured it 
towards making a concession on the emergency clause.  
  
We see a similar mechanism at work when explaining the German government’s concessions 
regarding bail-in rules. In the current situation, strict bail-in provisions were expected to have a 
detrimental effect on Southern European economies because of an increased burden on banks 
and a higher risk of contagion leading further financial fragmentation (De Grauwe, 2013b). 
According to Moscovici, ‘Banking union means putting an end to the financial fragmentation of 
Europe’ (Moscovici, 2013). The Italian Finance Minister Saccomanni reminded Schäuble of the 
importance of the banking union to measuring up to these expectations: ‘All the finance ministers 
agreed that an important step to reactivate financing activity on markets is the completion of the 
banking union project’ (cit. in Reuters, 2013a). Again, the German government’s previous 
commitment to the goal of breaking the vicious circle made it vulnerable and weakened its ability 
to insist on strict bail-in rules without appearing inconsistent.  
Thirdly, while all member states had vowed to the objective of breaking the vicious circle, 
reaching this goal without any mutualisation and risk-sharing was largely unrealistic. Confronted 
with the German government’s continued opposition to a joint resolution fund, the Southern 
coalition started to question the government’s commitment to this shared objective. The Italian 
Finance Minister Saccomanni stated: ‘I am also confident that we also share a common goal, 
which is precisely the one for which the Member States have decided to set up the Banking 
Union: to break the nexus between banking and sovereign risks and restore the orderly 
functioning of the Single Market for financial services. In order to break the nexus I recalled, we 
have to establish a system which is effective (…). It has to rely on common financial resources’ 
(Saccomanni, 2013, p. 1). The ECB argued: ‘By pooling resources, the [SRF] will be able to 
protect taxpayers more effectively than under national arrangements, and thus break the adverse 
nexus between banks and their respective sovereigns’ (European Central Bank, 2013b, p. 8). This 
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standard of legitimacy significantly constrained the German government’s bargaining power on a 
key aspect of the banking union. The German government’s long-held normative commitment to 
multilateral solutions, which, however, seems hardly reconcilable with the German government 
being isolated (Bulmer, 2014, pp. 1248–1250), increased its vulnerability to manipulations of the 
standard of legitimacy. Even though Germany successfully attached strings to the funds, the 
Southern coalition reached their priority objective by appealing to a shared normative standard.  
Fourthly, the German government’s insistence on a fuller involvement of the Council would have 
rendered decision-making complicated and questioned the banking union’s effectiveness. The 
Commissioner responsible, Michel Barnier, criticised the procedure as ‘too complex’ (Financial 
Times, 2013d). The Irish Finance Minister Noonan was sceptical about its effectiveness: ‘In 
resolving a bank, one would want to be able to do it over a single weekend at the maximum. So 
anything that is too cumbersome, with various layers to it, won't be effective’ (Reuters, 2013b). 
According to Mario Draghi, ‘[e]verybody knows that these decisions must be taken instantly (…). 
We can't have hundreds of people debating whether a bank is viable or not’ (cit. in EU Observer, 
2013). Likewise, Italian finance minister Saccomanni stated: ‘A credible SRM is first of all a 
system that is actually able to make quick decisions and to swiftly manage any resolution 
procedure’ (Saccomanni, 2013, p. 1). Once again, the isolated German government was 
vulnerable towards these demands. In order to maintain argumentative consistency with its 
commitment to break the vicious circle, the German government was forced to make 
concessions.  
Across all four issues, the same pattern is evident: The German government’s preferences were 
putting at risk the banking union’s capacity to break the vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns. Yet, the heads of state or government had previously agreed on this goal. 
Consequently, despite strong power asymmetries the German government was vulnerable 
towards demands to agree to an effective banking union as this corresponded to the standard of 
legitimacy among negotiators. We conclude on strong evidence for hypothesis 4. 
 
Conclusion 
This article’s analysis of the banking union negotiations has identified key shortcomings in the 
ability of approaches based on material interests and bargaining power to explain the agreement 
on a banking union in Europe. It suggests instead that an ideational frame can fill these gaps both 
with regard to national preference formation and interstate bargaining.  
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The following two tables conclude the above analysis by comparing the observable implications 
of each hypothesis with the preferences of the German government (table 5) and the outcome of 
the banking union negotiations (table 6).  
 
Table 5: Observable implications of each hypothesis for preference formation, in relation 
to the German government’s preferences 
 H1a: Public 
Banks 
H1b: Private 
Banks 
H1c: 
Compromise 
banking sector 
H3: Ordoliberal 
ideas 
Preference of 
German government 
1: Scope Limited All-
encompassing 
Moderate scope: 
Excluding 
Sparkassen, 
including 
Landesbanken 
Limited Limited 
2: Bail-
In 
Weak and non-
automatic bail-
in 
Strong bail-ins, 
but with 
discretion 
Moderate bail-in Strong and 
automatic bail-in 
Strong and automatic 
bail-in 
3: SRF National funds Joint fund National funds 
with some joint 
liabilities or joint 
fund with 
significant 
safeguards 
National funds National funds 
4: SRM 
Decisio
n-
Making 
Effective Effective Effective National vetoes National vetoes 
 
 
Table 6: Observable implications of each hypothesis for interstate bargaining, in relation 
to the outcome 
 H2: Power (German 
preference) 
H4: Ideas (vicious circle) Outcome 
1: Scope Limited Joint supervision for all banks (to reach 
critical scope of BU) 
Limited scope, but ECB 
intervention clause 
2: Bail-In Strong and automatic 
bail-in 
Weak bail-in (to reduce burden on 
strained banks) with significant 
discretion (to prevent systemic crises) 
Moderate bail-in with some 
discretion 
3: SRF National funds Joint fund (to separate banks and 
sovereigns) 
Joint fund (55bn €) 
4: SRM 
Decision-
Making 
National vetoes Decision-making possible over a 
weekend (for effective BU) 
Streamlined (albeit complex) 
decision-making with very limited 
MS veto rights 
 
In contrast to H1a, H1b and H1c, explaining the preferences of the German government with 
the interests of the most powerful domestic interest group produces unsatisfactory results. While 
the public banks’ preferences could explain the government’s preferences regarding scope and 
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SRF, they fail to account for the bail-in rules and the SRM decision-making. The private banks 
match the government’s preference only regarding bail-in rules, but not at the other three issues. 
The compromise hypothesis is disconfirmed across all four issues. The producers’ preferences 
match those of the government only as far as the scope is concerned. Remarkably, all interest 
groups fail to account for the SRM decision-making. This leads us to conclude that material 
interests cannot account convincingly for German preferences in the banking union negotiations. 
This case presents strong evidence against the hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c.  
To confirm fully the liberal intergovernmentalist hypothesis H2, the outcome of the negotiations 
would have to follow the German government’s preferences, owing to its material bargaining 
power and low preference intensity. While liberal intergovernmentalism accounts for the 
centrality of the German government in the negotiations, it is also evident across all four cases 
that the government made significant concessions. It ‘failed to prevent agreement on the critical 
components of the banking union’ (Epstein and Rhodes, 2014, p. 23). These concessions go 
beyond what could be interpreted as strategic concessions and cheap side-payments. The 
outcome disconfirms hypothesis H2. 
Ideas do explain what interest-based accounts cannot explain. The German government’s 
preferences match the observable implications of the ordoliberal paradigm on all four 
contentious issues. Key principles of ordoliberalism, such as aligning responsibility and liability 
influenced German positions on the scope, bail-in, SRF and the SRM decision-making procedure. 
The preferences of the German government support hypothesis H3.  
The strategic use of the idea of a vicious circle between banks and sovereigns persuasively 
explains how the German government was forced into concessions on key aspects of the banking 
union. Its power in the negotiations stems from a recognition by the German government 
(Merkel, 2012; Schäuble, 2013), affirmed not least in statements of the Euro Summit (Euro 
Summit, 2012, p. 1) or the European Council (European Council, 2012, p. 8). The Southern 
coalition successfully relied on this idea as a shared standard of legitimacy that the negotiations 
needed to adhere to. It prescribed an institutional design of the banking union running counter to 
German preferences. There is evidence across all four cases that manipulating the standard of 
legitimacy to include breaking the vicious circle shifted the outcome in a direction that makes it 
more likely for the banking union to ultimately break the said circle. This lends support to 
hypothesis H4.  
While there is strong evidence for an impact of ideas, this article acknowledges parallel drivers. 
There are occasional matches between the observable implications of ideas and some material 
interests, something that is almost unavoidable in cases with large diversity of preferences. As the 
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government neither consistently followed the public nor the private banks nor a compromise, 
these occasional matches appear random; this weakens a material interest explanation 
significantly. Nevertheless, it cannot be fully excluded that matching material interests influenced 
the government to some extent as well.  
Ordoliberalism’s focus on ‘put-your-own-house-in-order-strategies’ and preventing moral hazard 
is occasionally aligned with the interests of the German taxpayer. Does this mean ordoliberal 
ideas are merely camouflage for taxpayers’ powerful material interests? A taxpayer account indeed 
has some explanatory power. For instance, the taxpayers’ interest in making banks and not 
taxpayers liable for bank failures is an obvious parallel driver for the German preference for bail-
ins. It potentially also explains why the Single Resolution Fund is funded by banks and not out of 
government coffers (even though this was no contentious issue). On the flipside, it is difficult to 
explain German preferences in their entirety with the interests of taxpayers since they do not 
speak to all of the four issues. The most contentious question of the SRM negotiations was 
whether there should be a joint resolution fund or a network of national funds, but all parties 
agreed early on that any fund would be financed by banks. As no taxpayers' money was to be 
involved, we would expect taxpayers to be rather indifferent towards this issue. Likewise, it is 
difficult to identify the taxpayer as the critical motivator behind the German preference for a 
limited scope as well as a Council involvement in bank resolution decision-making, especially as 
the funds used for bank restructuring are not tax money, but contributions from banks. In sum, 
the taxpayer account is useful for some aspects of the negotiations, but suffers from severe 
limitations. Ordoliberal ideas give a more complete and convincing picture. Overall, this article 
provides further evidence for ideas as long-standing features in EMU negotiations from 
Maastricht (Jabko, 2006; McNamara, 1998; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999) up until crisis 
management (Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013; Siems and Schnyder, 2014). Both their constitutive and 
strategic-manipulative roles in the banking union negotiations are only the most recent cases 
manifesting their impact. These results suggest that ideational paradigms will remain crucial for 
understanding the governance of the economic and monetary union.  
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